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Foley: Hate Crimes: An Analysis of the View from Above

HATE CRIMES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
VIEW FROM ABOVE
TOM FOLEYt

My introduction to oral argument before the United States
Supreme Court was relatively unusual, and now that the decision in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul' has been announced, some
would say that it also was prophetic. I had not even arranged
my papers on the lectern before Mr. Justice Blackmun announced that he had a few "trivial" questions for me. One of
these questions concerned a park very near the location of the
cross burning that was the subject of the case. As a St. Paul
native, Justice Blackmun said he remembered the view of the
city from that location to be one of the most beautiful views
anywhere. Yet, he said, when he visited the park last summer,
"the grass was so high you couldn't see the view" of the city.
Justice Blackmun wanted me to see what I could do, as counsel
for the City of St. Paul in this particular case, to have the city
maintenance department cut the grass. This brief exchange,
for the most part unrelated to the case itself, prompted some
laughter throughout the courtroom, which, in turn, allowed
me to feel a bit more at ease with my argument.
Having reviewed the Court's decision a few times now, I
wonder if Justice Blackmun was warning me with his question
to beware of the way the Court may view the case before it.
Although the entire Court recognized in R.A. V the compelling
interest a community like St. Paul has to protect its citizens
from discrimination, intimidation, coercion, and harassment,
its majority decision and the premises that underlie its conclusions about St. Paul's bias-motivated disorderly conduct ordinance fundamentally misunderstand such legislation.
The majority decision in R.A. V. begins and ends its reasont Ramsey County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota. B.A. 1969,J.D. 1972, University of Minnesota.
Mr. Foley was counsel of record for the respondent in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul. The
author would like to thank Tim Murphy, Special Assistant Ramsey County Attorney,
for his help in preparing this essay.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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ing with the First Amendment, failing to recognize the other
constitutional principles which must be considered and ignoring completely the stated purpose of St. Paul's regulation. It is
as though the R.A. V majority is either unable or unwilling, for
all the importance of the First Amendment's protections, to
see some of the most pressing constitutional issues.
St. Paul has never argued that the First Amendment is not
important to the resolution of the R.A. V case or that communities like it should be permitted to sacrifice the constitutional
guarantees provided by the First Amendment in the interest of
providing equal protection for the members of its community.
Indeed, St. Paul as much as any community believes in the importance and necessity of the freedom of speech. St. Paul's
argument is that it should be permitted to punish, with particularity, specific criminal acts that result in unique actual and social harm. No act having the intended purpose of causing fear
and actual injury to others should find protection behind the
First Amendment.
INTRODUCTION

The title of this Symposium-R.A. V v. St. Paul: More Conflict

Between Free Speech and Equality-accurately identifies the Constitutional interests that must be considered in regulating communication that is uttered solely for the purpose of inflicting
injury on a person, family or group. The interests of equality
and free speech in the context of so-called "hate" speech regulation are typically but unnecessarily so entangled that it is difficult to identify and give adequate value to the underlying
purpose and design of such regulations. Professor Charles
Lawrence has written that the unconscious racism which exists
in all of us "causes us (even those . . .who are the direct vic-

tims of racism) to view the First Amendment as the 'regular'
amendment-an amendment that works for all people-and
the equal protection clause and racial equality as a special interest amendment important to groups that are less valued." 2
The First Amendment has for so long been viewed as one of
the most important elements for successful democratic selfgovernance and the pursuit of truth that it tends to overshadow other important interests reflected in the Constitution.
2. Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 474-75.
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When balanced in the context of hate speech regulation,
against equality and dignity,3 First Amendment values have
been afforded an overarching value, often with the effect of impeding the progress and attainment of other constitutional
guarantees.
Unfortunately, Justice Antonin Scalia's majority decision in
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul may succeed in eclipsing the constitutional provisions that aim to provide equality and dignity to
those who have historically been denied these values. It is also
unfortunate that the Court's decision could shade the values of
equality and dignity and at the same time seriously weaken the
authority of years of First Amendment jurisprudence, thus
making it possible for the first time for a community to regulate virtually any speech so long as it can attach some neutral,
non-speech justification for doing so. It is this last ironic result-the weakening of the First Amendment-which is, perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the R.A.V. decision.
IN RE WELFARE OF R.A.

V

At issue in the R.A. V case was the constitutionality of a St.
Paul, Minnesota, disorderly conduct ordinance which made it a
misdemeanor to place an object or appellation such as a burning cross or nazi swastika on public or private property knowing that such conduct will arouse anger, alarm, or resentment
in another because of their race, religion or gender.
In 1990, St. Paul attempted to use the ordinance to prosecute a juvenile who placed a burning cross in the yard of a
black family living in a predominantly white St. Paul neighborhood. Initially the case was dismissed by the trial court based
on the ground that the ordinance unconstitutionally infringed
on the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.4 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
3. For a powerful and informative discussion of the balancing of the First
Amendment and other constitutional provisions in the context of the regulation of
campus hate speech and violence, see Charles H. Jones, Equality, Dignity and Harm:
The Constitutionalityof Regulating American Campus Ethnoviolence, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1383
(1991). But see UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 774
F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding overbroad and unduly vague University of
Wisconsin's Design for Diversity Rule). UWM Post reflects the fate similar college
speech codes will face in the aftermath of R.A. V.
4. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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decision, holding that the ordinance, when read in light of the
many similarly worded disorderly conduct ordinances throughout Minnesota, was designed to apply only to situations where
the actor's conduct or expression could be viewed as "fighting
words," tending by their very utterance to inflict injury or incite a breach of the peace.' Interpreted in this way, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the ordinance was to be
used to regulate only "those expressions of hatred and resorts
to bias-motivated personal abuse that the first amendment
does not protect ....

[T]he ordinance is a narrowly tailored

means toward accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the community against bias-motivated
threats to public safety and order, and therefore is not prohibited by the first amendment. '"6
R.A.V

V. CITY OF ST. PAUL

The case was appealed by the juvenile to the United States
Supreme Court, where a majority of the Court's members disagreed with the Minnesota Supreme Court's handling of the
central issue of the case, namely: whether a community may
make the political decision to punish certain forms of communication where, in its collective opinion, the value of the communication is outweighed by the value of preventing the
personal and social harm likely to result from such communication. Five of the Court's members followed Justice Scalia's
reasoning in holding the St. Paul ordinance unconstitutional
because it singled out a specific form of speech and silenced it
because of its content-something which, in the opinion of the
majority, amounted to the "official suppression of ideas." 7
The majority opinion, therefore, develops the rule that, with
exception, any regulation that attempts to single out certain
expression for special treatment-even if that expression falls
within one of the traditionally unprotected speech categories
("fighting words," obscenity, or defamation)-is presumptively invalid.
Four of the Court's members strongly disagreed with Justice
Scalia's reasoning and found no constitutional flaw in singling
5.
6.
7.
joined

Id. at 510.
Id. at 511.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992). Justice Scalia was
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Souter, Kennedy, and Thomas.
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out and prohibiting portions of speech categories, such as
"fighting words" and obscenity, which do not have value. Justice White, writing in part for the minority, observed that the
Supreme Court's decisions concerning the First Amendment
"have plainly stated that expression falling within certain limited categories so lacks the values the First Amendment was
designed to protect that the Constitution affords no protection
to that expression." 8
Characterizing the majority opinion's theory that regulations
turning on the content of expression are presumptively invalid
as "puzzling," Justice White next observed that the Court's
majority opinion effectively "legitimates hate speech as a form
of discussion." 9 In addition, the minority discusses a number
of inconsistencies in Justice Scalia's requirement that a community must ban all "fighting words" if it is to ban any at all.
First, it is permissible under the majority opinion for a community to prohibit specific forms of expression within a category of unprotected speech if the reason for singling out a
specific form of expression is "the very reason the entire class
of speech at issue is proscribable."' 0 For example, the statute
which makes it illegal to threaten the life of the President,
although indicating a particular disfavor for a particular form
of threat, would be constitutional under the majority reasoning
because it is necessary not to suppress the idea of assassinating
the President but to prevent the chaos which could follow such
an expression."
A second and particularly ominous exception considers regulation of the "secondary effects" of speech, where the regulation is "justified without reference to the content of the . . .
speech."' 2 This exception was first discussed in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,'3 and was later perfected with the deci8. Id. at 2551 (White, J., concurring). Justice White was joined by Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor and Stevens, who joined except as to Part I.A. of Justice

White's opinion. Additionally, Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurrence, as did
Justice Stevens, with whom Justices White and Blackmun joined as to Part I of that
opinion.
9. Id. at 2553-54 (White, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 2545.
11. Id. at 2556 (White, J., concurring) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705 (1969) (per curiam)).
12. Id. at 2546 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986))
(alterations by the Renton Court).
13. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (considering Detroit's "Anti-Skid Row" ordinances,
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sion of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.' 4 and Boos v. Berry.' 5 The
practical impact of the secondary effects exception, as it has
developed, is that communities may prohibit any speech they
wish so long as they can concoct some neutral and technically
removed reason for prohibiting the speech.
The third exception carved out of the majority's new rule
that content-based regulations are presumptively invalid is a
catchall that will allow regulation based on content provided
"there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of
ideas is afoot."' 6 The existence of "adequate" content-neutral
alternatives to a content-based regulation, which the majority
believed were present in R.A. V, would undermine even a compelling state interest and would result in the presumption that
suppression of ideas is afoot. 17
Each of the foregoing exceptions appear to detract from the
force of the majority's view that regulations relying on the content of speech are presumptively invalid. This detraction is
particularly damaging, according to the minority opinions, in
light of the fact that the purpose and design of the St. Paul
ordinance arguably fits each of the exceptions. As Justice Stevens understands the example offered by the majority to illustrate its first exception-that content distinctions may be used
within an unprotected category of expression if the distinction
is based on the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable-"Congress may choose from the set of unprotected speech (all threats) to proscribe only a subset (threats
against the President) because those threats are particularly
likely to cause 'fear of violence,' 'disruption,' and actual 'violence.' Precisely this same reasoning, however, compels the
conclusion that St. Paul's ordinance is constitutional."' 8
The majority's basis for overturning the Minnesota Supreme
Court is also apparently inconsistent with a wealth of U.S.
which prohibited adult theaters and book stores within 1,000 feet.of any two other
regulated theaters or book stores).
14. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
15. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
16. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
17. Id. at 2550. The majority stated that R.A.V. could have been prosecuted
under several content-neutral laws. See MINN. STAT. § 609.713 (1992) (terroristic
threats); id. § 609.595 (criminal damage to property); id. § 609.563 (arson). However, given the facts presented in R.A. V. and the general interpretation of these statutes, it is questionable whether St. Paul could have used them successfully.
18. Id. at 2565 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court jurisprudence. For instance, the entire Court
concedes that St. Paul has succeeded in presenting a compelling interest in regulating hate speech and crime-"to ensure
the basic human rights of members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination ... ."9 Yet the majority
ignores the strict scrutiny analysis that would have upheld the
ordinance had it addressed expression that has traditionally
found protection behind the First Amendment.20 Justice
Blackmun suggests in a separate concurrence that the majority
holding in R.A. V
will be regarded as an aberration-a case where the Court
manipulated doctrine to strike down an ordinance whose
premise it opposed, namely, that racial threats and verbal
assaults are of greater harm than other fighting words. I
fear that the Court has been distracted from its proper mission by the temptation to decide the issue over "politically
correct speech" and "cultural diversity," neither of which is
presented here....
I see great harm in preventing the people of Saint Paul
from specifically punishing the race-based fighting words
that so prejudice their community. 2 '
The minority opinions strongly assert the view that the aim
of St. Paul's bias-motivated disorderly conduct ordinance
clearly is not to suppress ideas.2 2 This position is affirmed by
Justice Stevens in a separate concurrence, where he notes "the
St. Paul ordinance restricts speech in confrontational and potentially violent situations," where the words, by their very utterance inflict injury. 23 The aim is not the suppression of ideas
but the prevention of the harm created by conduct in certain
contexts. "[T]he ordinance regulates only a subcategory of expression that causes injuries based on 'race, color, creed, religion, or gender,' not a subcategory that involves discussions that
concern those characteristics. '2 4 With this purpose in mind, it
is clear that the suppression of ideas is not afoot. An individ19. Id. at 2554 (White, J., concurring).
20. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that compelling
interest in protecting children justifies regulation prohibiting the distribution of depictions of children engaging in sexual conduct).

21. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2560-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 2558 (White, J., concurring) ("this case does not concern the official
suppression of ideas").
23. Id. at 2569 (Stevens, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 2570 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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ual would be prosecuted under St. Paul's ordinance only where
the individual's "expression" is conducted with the purpose of
inflicting injury. Where the purpose of the expression is the
discussion of ideas, the individual would not be subject to
prosecution.
The downfall of the ordinance in the minority opinions is its
treatment of the overbreadth doctrine. Given the way the St.
Paul ordinance is worded, the minority believes it would prohibit not only expression that is uttered with the purpose and
has the effect of causing actual injury, but it also would prohibit expression that merely causes "hurt feelings, offense, or
resentment"-expression which clearly is protected by the
First Amendment. 25 The minority hints at the defining elements it would have required in order to uphold the ordinance
when it notes that although the First Amendment protects expression that is offensive and causes hurt feelings, it does not
require that one must be subjected to such expression at all
times-particularly when one is perceived as a targeted and
captive audience.26
ST. PAUL'S RESPONSE

The Illusion of Unanimity
The R.A. V decision, taken as a whole, is remarkable for a
variety of reasons but foremost for its illusory undertones.
One can begin with the appearance that the Court's decision is
unanimous. As a technical matter, the Court's decision is
unanimous-all nine members of the Court believed the St.
Paul ordinance violated the Constitution. Upon a closer reading of the opinions, however, one finds the Court is very
sharply divided over the central issue that decides the case.
Five justices believe it is not permissible for a community to
regulate fighting words based on their ideological content, and
four justices find no harm in doing so, and in fact, provide a
25. Id. at 2560 (White, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 2560 n.13 (White, J., concurring) (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
484-85 (1988), and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748- 49 (1978)). The Court
chose not to address the captive, targeted audience issue "because of the manner in
which the Minnesota Supreme Court construed the . . . ordinance." Id. This is a
surprising way for the Court to answer the issue of the captive audience since the
issue was fully briefed by St. Paul and was therefore "before" the Court for its consideration. See Brief for Respondent at 32-33, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss4/2

8

1992]

Foley: Hate Crimes: An Analysis of the View from Above
HATE SPEECH AFTER R.A.V.

number of different examples of how the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence already regulates unprotected speech
based on the content of that speech. Therefore, to read the
R.A. V decision as a unanimous rejection of the idea that a
community may not regulate bias-motivated attacks against its
members misunderstands the import of the decision.
Four members of the Court believe such regulations are permissible and also necessary, provided they are more narrowly
tailored to address the specific harm the regulations aim to
prevent. A successful hate speech regulation according to the
minority position, would be more specific in identifying the
kinds of injuries inflicted by the expression St. Paul sought to
regulate.27 Additionally, a successful hate speech regulation
would require a narrowed scope of application such as that
found in the Court's Frisby decision, where it upheld an ordinance which prohibited "picketing before and about the residence or dwelling of an individual," noting that "individuals
are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their
homes and that the government may protect this freedom. "28
The differences between the majority and minority opinions
are so significant, from the point of view of communities that
wish to address the actual and social injuries caused by acts of
racial hatred, that, for practical purposes, the minority opinions may be classified as dissents. The result of the R.A. V majority opinion is that communities like St. Paul may not address
with particularity the injuries and harm caused by racial hatred;
the minority opinions would allow St. Paul to address these
problems with particularity, given a more carefully crafted
ordinance.
27. R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2558-60 (White, J., concurring); see also Charles H.Jones,
Proscribing Hate: Distinctions Between Criminal Harm and Protected Expression, 18 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 935, 950-59 (1992) (discussing actual injuries inflicted by acts and
speech motivated by racial hatred); Ruth Wedgwood, Why Protect Racial Speech?, YALE
L. REP., Spring 1990, at 8. Wedgwood writes:
[M]inority groups lack the same capacity for physical self-help and may suffer palpable and justifiable fear at even 'abstract' suggestions or intimations
that they should be harmed. A government may not be able to prevent injury to vulnerable members of a group when choate danger is finally at
hand. And there is fear, not historically absurd, that a government will
choose not to act. Why should any group that has lived with racial violence
be asked to regard group threats as abstract or idle speech? Such speech
causes a real harm, destroying a citizen's sense of physical security.
Id. at 11.
28. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477, 485 (1988).
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If You Cut Down All The Laws
Those First Amendment purists who initially lauded the
R.A. V. decision as the latest affirmation of and victory for free
speech may in time regret R.A. V 's majority holding. Already,
pundits have read the R.A. V. decision as a subtle but effective
attack on the university speech codes which have evolved from
the so-called "political correctness" movement. 2 9 Yet, given a
more detailed reading of the majority's decision, the First
Amendment purist will find that it is more an ally for thought
control than an enemy.
The pundits quickly point out that the majority holding in
R.A. V does not suddenly make legal the burning of crosses
and painting of swastikas on targeted individuals' property.
The argument made by the pundits and by the Court's majority is that a community may prohibit and punish such conduct
without violating the Constitution only if it does so using laws
that are neutral with respect to whom they protect and what
they prohibit. For example, in the case of R.A. V, St. Paul
could have prosecuted the cross-burning by charging terroristic threats, 3 0 criminal damage to property,3 ' or arson.3 Each
of these laws punish the conduct of placing a burning cross in
the yard of a black family living in a predominantly white
neighborhood without making the statement that the community disfavors this type of conduct more than a cross-burning
conducted as part of an organized, public demonstration.3
Taken a step further, all of the neutral laws mentioned above
prohibit cross-burning without indirectly supporting the ideological position that those who abhor such conduct would support-for instance, that it is more desirable than not to have
diverse and integrated neighborhoods, or simply that it is
wrong to force a family out of a neighborhood because of their
race or religion.
29. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Scalia vs. PoliticalCorrectness, MPLS. STAR TRIB.,

June 28, 1992, at 18A.
30. See MINN. STAT. § 609.713 (1990).
31. See id. § 609.595.
32. See id. § 609.563.
33. As suggested earlier, it is questionable, given the facts presented in R.A. V
and the general interpretation given to the three statutes mentioned above, that St.
Paul would have been successful in prosecuting R.A.V. under any of the three. Yet
all parties agree-including R.A.V.'s counsel-that the act of placing a burning cross
in the yard of a black family in the middle of the night constitutes a criminal offense.
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It is important to understand that St. Paul's bias-motivated
disorderly conduct ordinance is concerned with hateful ideology to the same extent, for instance, that Minnesota's aggravated robbery statute is concerned with the ideology that
motivates a criminal to use a dangerous weapon while committing a robbery. 4 It is generally accepted that communities
may choose specific punishment for a specific crime based on
the harm that results from the crime, yet the Court becomes
uneasy when the punishment can be seen to show preference
for an idea or group.
The fear in having laws like St. Paul's bias-motivated disorderly conduct ordinance is that there is apparently no limit to
what could be added to or subtracted from the list of groups
and interests to be protected, with the ultimate possibility that
all offensive speech could be silenced. R.A.V.'s brief states this
fear in a poignant way by quoting from A Man For All Seasons.
In an exchange between Roper and Sir Thomas More, Roper
questions the prudence of giving the Devil the benefit of the
law. Roper would not hesitate to cut down every law to get at
the Devil, but Thomas More would give the Devil the benefit of
the law if only for his own safety's sake. After all, More explains, "when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you-where would you hide, the laws all being flat?
...[I]f you cut them down . . .d'you really think you could
'3 5
stand upright in the winds that would blow then?
Although persuasive, there are flaws in the logic of More's
argument, particularly if it is to be taken as the strength of
R.A.V.'s and the majority opinion's arguments. More's argument is based on the unsupported reasoning that the denial of
the benefit of one law to the Devil will inevitably result in the
denial of the benefit of all laws, therefore leaving no laws to
protect against the Devil. If one applies this logic to the R.A. V
case, the argument that a community could and would have
carte blanche to ban whichever fighting words it preferred cannot be taken seriously since it does not address the purpose of
"fighting words" regulations. A community would not be permitted to ban fighting words based on, for instance, political
34. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.245 (1992) (aggravated robbery) with id. § 609.24
(simple robbery).
35. Brief for Petitioner at 4, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992)
(No. 90-7675) (quoting ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS, act I, scene 6, at 56
(Samuel French, Inc. 1962)).
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party affiliation because it would be difficult to articulate some
compelling interest in doing so. In the end, to the extent that
an ordinance like St. Paul's can be viewed as favoring one ideology ("acts of racial hatred are bad") over another ("acts of
racial hatred are protected by the First Amendment"), the danger in singling out a subcategory of unprotected speech is far
less troublesome than giving that subcategory of traditionally
unprotected speech the same value as core First Amendment
speech, thus legitimizing such acts. This is just what the R.A. V
majority does.36
The Meaning of the Content Distinction
The more frightening illusion presented by the R.A. V majority is the signal the decision sends concerning the fallibility
of the First Amendment. When it is viewed in the light of several other recent First Amendment decisions which have indicated a willingness to apply lower levels of scrutiny to contentbased and content-neutral regulations alike, the possibility that
First Amendment purists will discover the "official suppression
of ideas is afoot" rationale becomes more, rather than less,
36. The majority's holding necessarily signals that expressions of violence, such
as the message of intimidation and racial hatred conveyed by burning a cross on
someone's lawn, are of sufficient value to outweigh the social interest in order and
morality that has traditionally placed such fighting words outside the First Amendment. Indeed, by characterizing fighting words as a form of "debate," the majority
legitimates hate speech as a form of public discussion. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112
S. Ct. 2538, 2554 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
Already courts have begun to struggle with this result-the legitimization of acts
of racial and religious hatred-when confronted with First Amendment arguments
attacking the constitutionality of penalty enhancement statutes. Enhancement statutes operate to increase or reclassify the penalties for crimes proved to be motivated
by some form of discrimination. Thus, if a defendant assaults a victim because of the
victim's race, religion, sexual preference, etc., the statutory penalty for the assault
may be increased. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(4) (1990) (racially motivated assault). Although R.A.V. was also charged by an enhancement statute, he did not
challenge that statute, and the court did not consider the statute in its decision.
Remarkably, some courts are beginning to apply the reasoning of the R.A. V. majority in holding enhancement statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., State v. Wyant, 597
N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992) (holding enhanced penalty law unconstitutional on the
ground that it punishes a defendant's motive for committing crime); State v. Mitchell,
485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992)
(holding enhanced penalty law unconstitutional on the ground that it infringes on a
defendant's freedom of thought). But see Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist
Ct. App. 1992) (upholding enhanced penalty on ground that it punishes acts of discrimination rather than targets thoughts on basis of expressive content); State v.
Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992) (upholding enhanced penalty on ground that it
proscribes effect of acts rather than actor's opinion).
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likely. It is clear now that all a government needs to do to suppress ideas is create a regulation which is directed at a harm
theoretically or facially unrelated to the speech interest to be
suppressed by the regulation. An examination of the Renton
case and its progeny shows how this is possible.
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.37 considered the constitution-

ality of a municipal ordinance prohibiting "adult" motion picture theaters from locating "within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone, church, park, or school."' 38

In upholding the

municipal ordinance, the Court noted that although the ordinance turned on the content of speech ("adult" movies), it did
not aim to regulate the speech itself, but the secondary effects
often associated with adult theaters, such as prostitution and
sexually motivated violence. Finding this as the predominant
intent of the Renton ordinance,, the Court labeled the ordinance as a content-neutral, time, place and manner regulation
justified without reference to the content of the speech. The
Court reasoned that Renton's ordinance served the substantial
governmental purpose of curbing vice crime, and that the ordinance left ample alternative channels for the showing of adult
movies. 9
Renton marked the beginning of a stream of Supreme Court
decisions which have extinguished the bright-line rule that
"any restriction on speech, the application of which turns on
the content of the speech, is a content-based restriction regardless of the motivation that lies behind it." 4 Beginning
with Renton, the Court has allowed a variety of arguably, if not
clearly, content-based regulations to pass constitutional muster under an intermediate or low standard of review.
In Boos v. Barry,4 ' a 1988 case considering the constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting picketing critical of a foreign
government within 500 feet of that government's embassy, a
plurality of the Court seemed willing to extend the "secondary
37. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
38. Id. at 43.
39. Id. at 53-54. Interestingly, the ordinance excluded adult theaters from approximately 94% of the city of Renton. Most of the remaining land was already occupied by sewage treatment facilities, a race track, an oil storage facility, and a fully
developed shopping center. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN &JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 257 (1991).

40. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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effects" test outside the context of low-value speech, and even
to political speech.4 2 Yet, Justice O'Connor, who was joined
by Justices Stevens and Scalia, rejected the state's argument
that the anti-picketing section of the regulation at issue was
constitutional since it was aimed at the "secondary effects" of
the picketing: "Listeners' reactions to speech are not the type
of 'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton.... The emotive

impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect.'
Because the [picketing] clause regulates speech due to its potential primary impact, we conclude it must be considered content-based."

4 3

Although only two other Justices agreed with Justice
O'Connor's primary/secondary effects analysis, the use of such
an analysis may seem alarming upon closer review. The Court
noted at the outset that the anti-picketing clause is contentbased, since the determination of whether an individual may
picket a foreign embassy or not depends on whether the pickets are critical of the foreign government. 44 After all, the
Court noted, " 'content-neutral' speech restrictions [are] those
that 'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' -45 The Court then distinguished the anti-picketing regulation in Boos from the regulation in Renton by
claiming that the justification for the regulation in Rentonpreventing sexually motivated violent crimes-had nothing to
do with the speech being regulated. "The content of the films
being shown inside the theatres was irrelevant and was not the
target of the regulation."4 6
True, the stated objective of the regulation in Renton was not
to censor adult movies but to curb vice crime, presumably motivated by adult movies. Yet, the problem with the analysis offered in Renton, as expanded in Boos, with the addition of the
"primary effects" analysis, is that it "relies on the dubious
proposition that a statute which on its face discriminates based
on the content of speech aims not at the content but at some
secondary effect that does not itself affect the operation of the
42. Id. at 320-21.
43. Id. at 321.
44. Id. at 320.
45. Id. (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
46. Id.
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statute."'47 The addition of a "primary effects" analysis does
little to relieve the dubious nature of the secondary effects test.
Consider the effect of a political assassin's bullet-it is primary
to the message behind the assassination, yet the regulation of
such conduct is justified despite that message, even though it is
inseparable from the message.
The R.A. V majority picks up on the distinction between primary and secondary effects and uses the distinction to dispose
of St. Paul's argument that the ordinance must be considered a
regulation of the secondary effects of hate speech. 4 ' Even so,
the majority preserves a variety of politically popular and necessary regulations which, but for the secondary effects exception as set out in Renton and reaffirmed in R.A. V would fall for
the reason that they single out a particular form of unprotected
expression for purposes of addressing a particular injury. As
the minority points out, the most obvious of these regulations
are the Title VII hostile work environment claims based on
sexual or racial harassment.4 9
Understanding the primary/secondary effects analysis is as
difficult as understanding the Court's conclusions in Barnes v.
Glen Theater, Inc.,5" which considered the regulation under an
Indiana public indecency statute regulating "totally nude dancing" in adult entertainment facilities. The indecency statute
made it a misdemeanor for anyone "knowingly or intentionally, in a public place [to]: (1) engage[] in sexual intercourse;
(2) engage[] in deviate sexual conduct; (3) appear[] in a state
of nudity; or (4) fondle[] the genitals of himself or another person ... ."" The statute had been construed by the Indiana
Supreme Court to mean that "[t]here is no right to appear
nude in public. Rather, it may be constitutionally required to
tolerate or to allow some nudity as part of some larger form of
expression meriting protection, when communication of ideas
47. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. "[Tlhe St. Paul ordinance is not directed to secondary effects within the

meaning of Renton. As we said in Boos v. Barry, ... '[l]isteners' reactions to speech are
not the type of "secondary effects" we referred to in Renton.... The emotive impact
of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect.' R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538, 2549 (1992).
49. Id. at 2557-58 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
50. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
51. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1(a) (1988).
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is involved." 52
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Indiana
adult entertainment facilities argued that Indiana could not
limit their dancers' performances by requiring that they wear
even a scant amount of clothing, without violating the dancers'
rights under the First Amendment. The State of Indiana, however, argued that the indecency statute was a valid "time, place
and manner" regulation which was justified in infringing on
any minimal First Amendment interests.
The Court's plurality decision in Barnes applied an intermediate level ofjudicial review to the indecency statute, using the
O'Brien test in its analysis."3 A plurality of the Barnes Court felt
nude dancing was marginally expressive but not entitled to full
First Amendment protection.5 1 In applying the four-part
O'Brien test, the Court found Indiana had a substantial interest
in protecting societal morality and order, and for this reason it
was within the state's power to enact an indecency statute. 5
The Court determined that Indiana's interest in societal morality and order was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and that any incidental restrictions the statute imposed
on First Amendment rights were justified by the state's
52. State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580, 587 (1979). "Nudity" is defined in the
statute as
the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks
with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with
less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of
covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1(b) (1988).
53. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-63 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968)). O'Brien considered the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the destruction or mutilation of draft registration cards:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
54. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy in the plurality opinion, in which Justices Scalia and Souter
concurred. Justice White was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens in
dissent.
55. Id. "Public indecency statutes such as the one before us reflect moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public places .... Id.
"This and other public indecency statutes were designed to protect morals and public order." Id. at 2462.
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interest.56

Justices Scalia and Souter joined in the Court's result but
filed separate concurrences which served to confuse the
Court's decision. Where the plurality opinion found that the
statute's prohibition of nude dancing necessarily brought First
Amendment analysis into play, Justice Scalia viewed the statute
as a general proscriptive regulation which, not being directed
specifically at protectable expression, did not call for First
Amendment analysis at all. Justice Scalia argued the statute
should be upheld on ground that the state had a rational basis
in moral opposition to public nudity for enacting the statute.
Justice Souter agreed with the plurality opinion that some
degree of First Amendment review was necessary in the evaluation of the statute's constitutionality. 5 Justice Souter also employed the O'Brien test in finding that Indiana's statute was
permissible, however, he believed the state's interest in
prohibiting nude dancing revolved around the "secondary effects" of such entertainment.5 9 Justice Souter looked to the
Court's decision in Renton and determined that Indiana had a
legitimate and substantial governmental interest in preventing
prostitution, sexual assaults, and other criminal activity often
associated with establishments which provide totally nude
dancing as entertainment.6 ° Justice Souter determined Indiana's interest in preventing the secondary effects associated
with nude dancing establishments was unrelated to the suppression of protectable expression since the "pernicious secondary effects" associated with the establishments are not
necessarily the result of the expression of nude dancing. 6
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice
White's dissent, which gave much more deference to the expressive characteristics of nude dancing than did the plurality
56. Id. at 2463.
57. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). "In my view ....
the challenged regulation must
be upheld, not because it survives some lower level of First-Amendment scrutiny, but
because, as a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First-Amendment scrutiny at all." Id.
58. Id. at 2468 (SouterJ., concurring). "[W]hen nudity is combined with expressive activity, its stimulative and attractive value certainly enhance the force of expression, and a dancer's acts in going from clothed to nude, as in a strip-tease, are
integrated into the dance and its expressive function." Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 2468-69 (Souter, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 2470 (Souter, J., concurring).
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or its concurring opinions. Justice White was quick to suggest
that Indiana's indecency statute was not the general prohibition that Justice Scalia thought, since it would allow for nudity
in certain "larger form" theatrical productions, such as
"Solome" and "Hair." 6 2 Moreover, the dissent stated:
The purpose of forbidding people from appearing nude in
parks, beaches, hot dog stands, and like public places is to
protect others from offense. But that could not possibly be
the purpose of preventing nude dancing in theaters and
barrooms since the viewers are exclusively consenting
adults who pay money to see these dances. The purpose of
the proscription in these contexts is to protect the viewers
from what the State believes is the harmful message that
nude dancing communicates. ... The attainment of [this]
goal[]... depends on preventing an expressive activity.
The Indiana law, as applied to nude dancing targets the
expressive activity itself; in Indiana nudity in a dancing performance is a crime because of the message such dancing

communicates. 63
Justice White clearly viewed the statute as content-based,
calling for stricter judicial scrutiny than the plurality and its
concurring opinions were willing to employ. Under strict scrutiny, Justice White felt it was difficult to find the compelling
state interest in the context of nude dancing before consenting
adults, that would justify the affirmance of the statute.'
The Barnes case illustrates the difficulties, under traditional
First Amendment analysis, of distinguishing between expression that "communicates" and other kinds of expression and
distinguishing between regulations that are "content-based"
and regulations that are "content-neutral." The Barnes decision represents the full spectrum of possible interpretations
that could attach to the regulation of one form of
62. Id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting).

Interestingly, it was Justice Scalia who

inquired at oral argument of counsel for the state of Indiana: "Am I correct in my
understanding of what Indiana law is? That there is an exception to the nudity law
somehow for artistic performances, is that right? . . . Which includes opera but not
go-go dancing?" Upon receiving an affirmative answer, Justice Scalia inquired further: "[W]here does that come from?... Is it the good-taste clause of the Constitution? How does one draw that line between Salome and the Kitty Cat Lounge?"
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456
(1991) (No. 90-26).
63. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473, 2476 (White, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2476 (White, J., dissenting).
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The Meaningful Distinction-A New Approach
As one can see even through a cursory evaluation of several
of the Court's recent First Amendment cases, there isa very
fine line between what the Court considers to be permissible
content-specific regulation and what it considers to be impermissible content-specific regulation. By introducing an intermediate standard of review with Renton and its progeny, and
allowing something less than strict judicial scrutiny for certain
content-specific regulations, the Court has created an artificial
distinction for suspect regulations which permits courts to find
reasons for upholding or rejecting regulations which effectively suppresses free expression.
The R.A. V.majority falls in line with the artificial distinction
which has been created by the current Court. To compound
the vulnerable position in which the First Amendment is left by
Renton and its progeny (including R.A. V.), the majority appears
to have abandoned the traditional strict scrutiny analysis.
Under the R.A. V. majority's approach, it makes no difference
that a community may have a compelling interest in regulating
speech based on its content, it may not regulate the speech
unless it can attach some removed neutral purpose for the regulation or unless it regulates the entire speech category
altogether.
The traditional categories for describing regulations affecting protectable expression, and the categories for describing
the expression itself, together with the attendant methods of
First Amendment analysis should be reconsidered so that communities like St. Paul may be permitted to address with specificity the actual personal injury and social harm caused by
conduct that is based on biased hatred. When a cross is
burned in the yard of an African American family, it is not
enough simply to charge a perpetrator with criminal damage to
property or with terroristic threats, as these charges do not address the actual harm caused by biased hatred.
65. See also Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.)
(considering regulation prohibiting begging and panhandling in New York subways
but permitting "solicitation for charitable, religious or political causes," public
speaking, and artistic performances for money), rev 'd in part & vacatedin part, 903 F.2d
146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
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The current categories and methods of analysis used by the
Court are not in touch with the types of First Amendment issues that have come before it recently and are likely to come
before it in the future. Under the current approach to First
Amendment issues, courts are forced to hang regulations and
expression on what they believe to be the appropriate peg.
Once pegged as either content-based or content-neutral,
courts then mechanically proceed through an analysis which
balances the state's interest in regulating expression against
any First Amendment interests. If the regulation happens to
address a specific kind of expression, the court will give deference to the First Amendment interest. If, on the other hand,
the regulation does not appear to address a specific kind of
expression, but rather the manner of expression, or no expression at all, the court effectively gives deference to the
regulation.
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no
law . ..

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press

,6 The process currently used by the majority in R.A. V
does not adequately provide for protection of speech as contemplated in the First Amendment.
Calling for the initial categorization of a regulation as content-based or content-neutral or somehow deserving of some
intermediate classification ignores the purpose of the First
Amendment. The initial step in the evaluation of a regulation
that purportedly has an impact on protected expression should
be to determine the intended purpose of the regulation. 67 It is
....

66. U.S. CONST. amend. I
67. It is the intended purpose rather than the motivation of the regulation that
should be evaluated. Chief Justice Warren once argued:
What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on
the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted
power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or
another legislator made a "wiser" speech about it.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir.
1983), rev'd sub nom., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984), Justice Scalia commented:
[T]he only "First Amendment analysis" applicable to laws that do not directly or indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of whether the
purpose of the law is to suppress communication. If not, that is the end of
the matter so far as First Amendment guarantees are concerned; if so, the
court then proceeds to determine whether there is substantial justification
for the proscription, just as it does in free-speech cases.
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not difficult to draft a content-neutral regulation that intends
to suppress protected expression. For example, a close examination of the legislative history behind the regulations involved in Ward v. Rock Against Racism68 and United States v.
O'Brien6 9 reveals regulations which, although classified by the
Court as content-neutral, were enacted in response to the very
kinds of controversies underlying the litigation.
Looking only to the government's purpose for enacting a
regulation is overly simplistic as a means of evaluating the constitutionality of regulations that effect free expression. However, a "purpose" approach may be a good starting point for
an evaluation. Many regulations may be declared constitutional or unconstitutional upon a brief evaluation of the wording of the regulation, its application, and the circumstances
surrounding its creation. If this "purpose" evaluation reveals
that the government aims to silence or disadvantage expression because it feels the expression is false,70 critical of the
government, 7' or offensive, 72 the regulation should be held
Id. at 622-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted); see also
Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
615, 698 (1991).
68. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). In Ward, the sound regulations at issue were enacted in
response to continued complaints of loud rock music each year at the "Rock Against
Racism" event. It would appear that the purpose of the regulation was not to suppress the performers' expression-the regulation did not ban the performance of
rock music-but to assert a content-neutral and legitimate governmental interest in
keeping music at reasonable sound levels. Of course, the argument may be made
that to the extent it is necessary to play rock music loud to express properly a
message condemning racism, the expression is inhibited by a regulation calling for
lower sound levels. It is hard, however, to argue under the facts of Ward that the
expression was suppressed by the regulation.
69. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Examination of the regulation at issue in O'Brien
reveals a questionable governmental purpose. The regulation which prevented the
knowing destruction or mutilation of one's draft certificate was enacted at a time
when there was incredible dissatisfaction with the United State's involvement in the
Vietnam war and burning a draft card had become a well-recognized means of protesting the war. Viewing the facts of O'Brien in this context suggests the government's purpose in enacting the regulation was to silence a very effective means for
criticizing the United State's involvement in Vietnam. Regulations with this kind of
purpose should be declared unconstitutional, whether or not they may be classified
as content-neutral or content-based; in either case, the effect is to suppress freedom
of expression,
70. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
71. See id. at 272-73.
72. See, e.g., Texas v.Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 21-26 (1971). But see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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unconstitutional.
If the regulation does not reveal an illegitimate purpose or
reveals only a suspicious purpose, such as in Renton or in
R.A. V., the interest of the government should be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny. A court should ask whether the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end. In all other cases, where the
regulation has a legitimate purpose and does not suspiciously
disadvantage expression, the regulation should be upheld, so
long as the government's interest in the regulation is substantial and there are adequate alternative avenues of expression
for those claiming that the regulation inhibits their right to
free expression.73
Finally, a new approach to First Amendment issues should
include an analysis of the "expression" itself: does the person
claiming First Amendment protection sincerely wish to engage
in speech or speech activity? Determining the sincerity of the
expression would depend on facts surrounding the expression,
such as the speaker's own statement of purpose and the context and means of the expression. An evaluation of expression
in this way would prevent those with negligible or illegal purposes from claiming constitutional protection.7 4
CONCLUSION

The R.A. V decision should be noted for its clear, unambiguous message that communities have a compelling interest in
protecting their citizens from acts of racial hatred and bigotry.
The R.A. V. decision is far from clear in suggesting how communities might serve that interest, however, and given time, it
is likely the R.A. V. decision will be viewed as "an aberration,"
73. This standard is comparable to the current O'Brien standard as clarified in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). Note, however, that the proposed standard looks to whether there are adequate alternative avenues of expression, rather than to whether the "regulation promotes a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Id. at 799 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). The deference should always lie with speech interest
rather than with governmental convenience.
74. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (prohibiting an
exception to state statute making the use of peyote illegal for use of the drug in
association with religious rituals associated with the Native American Church); State
v. Randall, 540 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting the claim for a constitutional exemption to state statute banning use of controlled substances, for use of
marijuana, LSD, and hashish by the members of the Aquarian Brotherhood Church).
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to borrow Justice Blackmun's description.75
The majority decision is not sound or even helpful to the
First Amendment. The R.A. V majority decision will be used in
the future, together with cases like Renton, Boos, and Barnes to
permit communities to enact regulations that suppress any
speech so long as some facially neutral justification can be offered to support the regulation. The suppression of speech
appears more rather than less feasible in the wake of R.A. V.
First Amendment purists will find this to be a sad irony.
Many of those who would support "hate" crime regulation
may even consider themselves First Amendment purists-they
do not wish to inhibit the First Amendment's protections.
From the point of view of those supporting hate crime regulation, the conduct which would be prosecuted is not speech at
all-it is injury. More importantly, the perpetrator of such
conduct does not wish to make a statement or to have a discussion. The purpose is to cause injury-and a particular one at
that-to the targeted victim.
St. Paul recognizes and honors the guarantees provided by
the First Amendment. St. Paul also recognizes its obligation to
protect its citizens from specific acts of intimidation, coercion,
and harassment, which inflict a unique actual and social harm.
It will continue to be St. Paul's position that no act having the
intended purpose of causing fear and actual injury to others
should find protection behind the First Amendment.
75. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2560 (1992).
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